Abstract:Research involving privacy-sensitive data has always been constrained by data scarcity, standing in sharp contrast to other areas that have benefited from data scaling. This challenge is becoming increasingly urgent as modern AI agents--such as OpenClaw and Gemini Agent--are granted persistent access to highly sensitive personal information. To tackle this longstanding bottleneck and the rising risks, we present Privasis (i.e., privacy oasis), the first million-scale fully synthetic dataset entirely built from scratch--an expansive reservoir of texts with rich and diverse private information--designed to broaden and accelerate research in areas where processing sensitive social data is inevitable. Compared to existing datasets, Privasis, comprising 1.4 million records, offers orders-of-magnitude larger scale with quality, and far greater diversity across various document types, including medical history, legal documents, financial records, calendars, and text messages with a total of 55.1 million annotated attributes such as ethnicity, date of birth, workplace, etc. We leverage Privasis to construct a parallel corpus for text sanitization with our pipeline that decomposes texts and applies targeted sanitization. Our compact sanitization models (<=4B) trained on this dataset outperform state-of-the-art large language models, such as GPT-5 and Qwen-3 235B. We plan to release data, models, and code to accelerate future research on privacy-sensitive domains and agents.
Abstract:Large reasoning models (LRMs) extend large language models with explicit multi-step reasoning traces, but this capability introduces a new class of prompt-induced inference-time denial-of-service (PI-DoS) attacks that exploit the high computational cost of reasoning. We first formalize inference cost for LRMs and define PI-DoS, then prove that any practical PI-DoS attack should satisfy three properties: (1) a high amplification ratio, where each query induces a disproportionately long reasoning trace relative to its own length; (ii) stealthiness, in which prompts and responses remain on the natural language manifold and evade distribution shift detectors; and (iii) optimizability, in which the attack supports efficient optimization without being slowed by its own success. Under this framework, we present ReasoningBomb, a reinforcement-learning-based PI-DoS framework that is guided by a constant-time surrogate reward and trains a large reasoning-model attacker to generate short natural prompts that drive victim LRMs into pathologically long and often effectively non-terminating reasoning. Across seven open-source models (including LLMs and LRMs) and three commercial LRMs, ReasoningBomb induces 18,759 completion tokens on average and 19,263 reasoning tokens on average across reasoning models. It outperforms the the runner-up baseline by 35% in completion tokens and 38% in reasoning tokens, while inducing 6-7x more tokens than benign queries and achieving 286.7x input-to-output amplification ratio averaged across all samples. Additionally, our method achieves 99.8% bypass rate on input-based detection, 98.7% on output-based detection, and 98.4% against strict dual-stage joint detection.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.




Abstract:Differential privacy (DP) has become the standard for private data analysis. Certain machine learning applications only require privacy protection for specific protected attributes. Using naive variants of differential privacy in such use cases can result in unnecessary degradation of utility. In this work, we refine the definition of DP to create a more general and flexible framework that we call feature differential privacy (FDP). Our definition is simulation-based and allows for both addition/removal and replacement variants of privacy, and can handle arbitrary and adaptive separation of protected and non-protected features. We prove the properties of FDP, such as adaptive composition, and demonstrate its implications for limiting attribute inference attacks. We also propose a modification of the standard DP-SGD algorithm that satisfies FDP while leveraging desirable properties such as amplification via sub-sampling. We apply our framework to various machine learning tasks and show that it can significantly improve the utility of DP-trained models when public features are available. For example, we train diffusion models on the AFHQ dataset of animal faces and observe a drastic improvement in FID compared to DP, from 286.7 to 101.9 at $\epsilon=8$, assuming that the blurred version of a training image is available as a public feature. Overall, our work provides a new approach to private data analysis that can help reduce the utility cost of DP while still providing strong privacy guarantees.
Abstract:We propose a new method for estimating how much a model ``knows'' about a datapoint and use it to measure the capacity of modern language models. Prior studies of language model memorization have struggled to disentangle memorization from generalization. We formally separate memorization into two components: \textit{unintended memorization}, the information a model contains about a specific dataset, and \textit{generalization}, the information a model contains about the true data-generation process. When we completely eliminate generalization, we can compute the total memorization, which provides an estimate of model capacity: our measurements estimate that GPT-style models have a capacity of approximately 3.6 bits per parameter. We train language models on datasets of increasing size and observe that models memorize until their capacity fills, at which point ``grokking'' begins, and unintended memorization decreases as models begin to generalize. We train hundreds of transformer language models ranging from $500K$ to $1.5B$ parameters and produce a series of scaling laws relating model capacity and data size to membership inference.




Abstract:Prompt injection attacks are a critical security vulnerability in large language models (LLMs), allowing attackers to hijack model behavior by injecting malicious instructions within the input context. Recent defense mechanisms have leveraged an Instruction Hierarchy (IH) Signal, often implemented through special delimiter tokens or additive embeddings to denote the privilege level of input tokens. However, these prior works typically inject the IH signal exclusively at the initial input layer, which we hypothesize limits its ability to effectively distinguish the privilege levels of tokens as it propagates through the different layers of the model. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a novel approach that injects the IH signal into the intermediate token representations within the network. Our method augments these representations with layer-specific trainable embeddings that encode the privilege information. Our evaluations across multiple models and training methods reveal that our proposal yields between $1.6\times$ and $9.2\times$ reduction in attack success rate on gradient-based prompt injection attacks compared to state-of-the-art methods, without significantly degrading the model's utility.




Abstract:Cloud-based services are making the outsourcing of sensitive client data increasingly common. Although homomorphic encryption (HE) offers strong privacy guarantee, it requires substantially more resources than computing on plaintext, often leading to unacceptably large latencies in getting the results. HE accelerators have emerged to mitigate this latency issue, but with the high cost of ASICs. In this paper we show that HE primitives can be converted to AI operators and accelerated on existing ASIC AI accelerators, like TPUs, which are already widely deployed in the cloud. Adapting such accelerators for HE requires (1) supporting modular multiplication, (2) high-precision arithmetic in software, and (3) efficient mapping on matrix engines. We introduce the CROSS compiler (1) to adopt Barrett reduction to provide modular reduction support using multiplier and adder, (2) Basis Aligned Transformation (BAT) to convert high-precision multiplication as low-precision matrix-vector multiplication, (3) Matrix Aligned Transformation (MAT) to covert vectorized modular operation with reduction into matrix multiplication that can be efficiently processed on 2D spatial matrix engine. Our evaluation of CROSS on a Google TPUv4 demonstrates significant performance improvements, with up to 161x and 5x speedup compared to the previous work on many-core CPUs and V100. The kernel-level codes are open-sourced at https://github.com/google/jaxite.git.




Abstract:This work advocates for the use of sequence level probabilities for quantifying the risk of extraction training data from Large Language Models (LLMs) as they provide much finer-grained information than has been previously obtained. We re-analyze the effects of decoding schemes, model-size, prefix length, partial sequence leakages, and token positions to uncover new insights that have were not possible in prior work due to their choice of metrics. We perform this study on two pre-trained models, LLaMa and OPT, trained on the Common Crawl and Pile respectively. We discover that 1) Extraction rate, the predominant metric used in prior quantification work, underestimates the threat of leakage of training data in randomized LLMs by as much as 2.14x. 2) Though, on average, larger models and longer prefixes can extract more data, this is not true with a substantial portion of individual sequences. 30.4-41.5% of our sequences are easier to extract with either shorter prefixes or smaller models. 3) Contrary to prior belief, partial leakage in the commonly used decoding schemes like top-k and top-p are not easier than leaking verbatim training data. 4) Extracting later tokens in a sequence is as much as 912% easier than extracting earlier tokens. The insights gained from our analysis show that it is important to look at leakage of training data on a per-sequence basis.
Abstract:Differential privacy (DP) is widely being employed in the industry as a practical standard for privacy protection. While private training of computer vision or natural language processing applications has been studied extensively, the computational challenges of training of recommender systems (RecSys) with DP have not been explored. In this work, we first present our detailed characterization of private RecSys training using DP-SGD, root-causing its several performance bottlenecks. Specifically, we identify DP-SGD's noise sampling and noisy gradient update stage to suffer from a severe compute and memory bandwidth limitation, respectively, causing significant performance overhead in training private RecSys. Based on these findings, we propose LazyDP, an algorithm-software co-design that addresses the compute and memory challenges of training RecSys with DP-SGD. Compared to a state-of-the-art DP-SGD training system, we demonstrate that LazyDP provides an average 119x training throughput improvement while also ensuring mathematically equivalent, differentially private RecSys models to be trained.




Abstract:Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows users to offload machine learning inference on untrusted servers without having to share their privacy-sensitive data. Despite their strong security properties, MPC-based private inference has not been widely adopted in the real world due to their high communication overhead. When evaluating ReLU layers, MPC protocols incur a significant amount of communication between the parties, making the end-to-end execution time multiple orders slower than its non-private counterpart. This paper presents HummingBird, an MPC framework that reduces the ReLU communication overhead significantly by using only a subset of the bits to evaluate ReLU on a smaller ring. Based on theoretical analyses, HummingBird identifies bits in the secret share that are not crucial for accuracy and excludes them during ReLU evaluation to reduce communication. With its efficient search engine, HummingBird discards 87--91% of the bits during ReLU and still maintains high accuracy. On a real MPC setup involving multiple servers, HummingBird achieves on average 2.03--2.67x end-to-end speedup without introducing any errors, and up to 8.64x average speedup when some amount of accuracy degradation can be tolerated, due to its up to 8.76x communication reduction.